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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between trade and the environment in a vertically integrated world
economy, an international market structure that deserves further scrutiny given its empirical rele-
vance. Next to the traditional free-riding incentive, we find that the stringency of environmental pol-
icy is influenced by terms-of-trade externalities and spillback externalities, where the latter refers to
the lack of an incentive by domestic policymakers to fully internalize the international welfare effects
of leakage. Moreover, these externalities are magnified if the degree of vertical integration increases.
In our setting, carbon leakage is always negative and we find that globalization, as defined as an in-
crease in (i) trade openness and (ii) the degree of vertical integration, has an ambiguous impact on the
responsiveness of pollution to local environmental policy. Finally, stronger input-output linkages can
mitigate the negative impact of increased openness to trade on global environmental quality.
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1 Introduction
The nature of international trade is changing. Since the middle of the 1980s trade in intermediate goods
has become one of the major features of the world economy. In addition to this trend most countries
have experienced an increase in the degree to which their exports are produced with imported inputs1.
Together, these two elements play a central role in the emergence of a global economy that, to an in-
creasing extent, is characterized by vertical integration. The objective of this paper is to determine
whether these relatively recent developments in the ongoing process of globalization shed new light on
the relationship between international trade and the environment. To this end, we set up a simple multi-
country general equilibrium model that captures the key elements of cross-country vertical integration.
In this setting several interesting results are obtained. For example, contrary to conventional wisdom
we find that unilateral climate change policy results in negative carbon leakage. Thus, accounting for
vertical integration seems relevant.
Recent research in the trade literature suggests that the process of globalization has occurred in two
consecutive waves. According to Baldwin (2006), ’the first unbundling allowed the spatial separation of
factories and consumers. The second unbundling spatially unpacked the factories and offices themselves’. Figure
1 shows the empirical relevance of his statements: since the end of the 1980s trade in intermediate goods
and business services have increased to a far greater extent than total trade (WTO, 2008). According to
Yeats (2001) intermediate input trade, or ’global production sharing’, already accounted for roughly
thirty percent of world trade in manufacturing goods in 19952.
Figure 1. Trends in world trade of total merchandise, intermediate goods and commercial services.
Source : WTO (2008). Note: Intermediates are classified as in Yeats (2001).
Amidst these structural changes there has been a growing concern that trade liberalization will intensify
regulatory competition in environmental policies between countries, thereby provoking a race to the
1Note that trade in intermediate goods does not necessarily lead to an increase in the degree to which exports are produced
with imported inputs. The reason is that in principle imported intermediate goods could be used to produce non-tradable goods
only. This is the case in the models by Acemoglu & Ventura (2002) and Benarroch & Weder (2006).
2For a more thorough overview of empirical studies in the field see Antras & Staiger (2008).
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bottom (see Ederington (2010)). In this respect, trade liberalization could have negative consequences
for global environmental quality. In an institutional context where the WTO and its members have
taken the lead in banning the use of most trade instruments, fear for such a race to the bottom does not
seem irrational. This does not represent a necessary outcome, however, as some have argued that there
might be a race to the top instead. If the elasticity of demand for domestic products on world markets
is sufficiently low, a significant fraction of the costs of environmental policy can be passed through
to foreigners via higher prices. This incentive is stronger the larger the portion of trade that crosses
national borders. Based on this argument, McAusland and Millimet (2011) explain how international
trade can thus be more beneficial for the environment than intranational trade.
Of course, there is a substantial amount of theoretical research that tries to determine whether trade,
directly or indirectly, results in environmental degradation. The usual method of analysis here is to
compare levels of pollution under autarky and under international trade, conditional on various forms
of environmental policy. So far the literature has focused on this approach while other, equally relevant
aspects of globalization have received fairly little attention or have been ignored altogether. In this
paper we consider a novel aspect of globalization, that is, (i) the degree of vertical integration across
countries in the context of trade in intermediate goods, which we complement with (ii) the degree of
trade openness, a more familiar notion of globalization. Like trade liberalization, vertical integration
represents a form of economic integration, but the latter is more relevant in the context of input markets.
This brings us to the main question of our paper: can the interdependency created by vertical integration
outweigh free-riding between nation states in the case of transboundary pollution? We show that an increase
in the degree of vertical integration increases the range of parameter values for which non-cooperation
leads to inefficiently high levels of environmental standards. In addition, input-output linkages de facto
reduce global pollution and thereby limit some of the negative effects induced by free-riding under non-
cooperative policymaking. The implication of these results is that the increasing interconnectedness
between countries in manufacturing industries might lead to better environmental outcomes (i.e. green
welfare) in a world where non-cooperative approaches to environmental policy remain important.
The rest of this chapter is set up as follows. In the next section, we contrast our approach with the
existing literature and preview some of our results. In section 3 we discuss the characteristics of our
trade model. In section 4 we discuss the relationship between environmental policy, terms-of-trade
effects, TFP effects and spillback effects, which forms the core of our analysis. This discussion is fol-
lowed by a typology of the various determinants of global pollution in section. Here, we also explain
how negative carbon leakage can arise in our model. Section 6 then compares the social optimum to
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. We analyze various properties of the Nash equilibrium and
carefully spell out the implications for global environmental quality. In section 7 we explain how glob-
alization can erode the possibility of nation states to effectively control local environmental quality. We
then move on to discuss the effects of strengthening the international input-output structure and con-
sider the effects of decentralization on global welfare and green welfare in section 8. The last section
concludes.
2 Literature Overview
The environmental consequences of trade in intermediate goods are relatively unexplored in the lit-
erature on trade and the environment. Some important exceptions are Benarroch and Weder (2006),
McAusland (2004) and Hamilton and Requate (2004). Hamilton and Requate (2004) examine strategic
environmental policy in a partial equilibrium model where exports are produced in a vertically related
industry structure with a downstream and upstream sector. They conclude that if vertical contracts
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are allowed, the optimal environmental tax that should be levied on the polluting input is actually a
Pigouvian tax. Our work is similar in the sense that we are interested in non-cooperative environmental
policy in the presence of a vertical production structure. Unlike their paper, we consider international
vertical structures instead of intranational vertical structures. Other important differences are our fo-
cus on general equilibrium and the input-output structure of production. Similar to our analysis, dirty
intermediate goods are a central element of McAusland (2004), but her focus is more specific, i.e. envi-
ronmental regulation as export promotion of an industry that is subject to economies of scale. Our focus
is on non-cooperative policies in a vertically integrated world economy instead of unilateral policies for
a small open economy. Benarroch and Weder (2006) consider a two-country model of trade in inter-
mediate goods with monopolistic competition. They only consider pollution from final goods, abstract
from optimal environmental policies and do not consider input-output linkages.
From a regulatory point of view, one can argue that international trade decouples the costs of envi-
ronmental policy from the benefits of environmental policy when compared to a situation of autarky or
interregional trade. This is because trade affects the costs, not the benefits, of environmental regulation
if a certain fraction of domestically produced goods is exported. Two conditions are crucial for our
argument. First, when determining the stringency of environmental regulation, the domestic regulator
only internalizes the costs of environmental policy in as far they are borne by domestic producers and
consumers. Second, export demand should be sufficiently inelastic such that the burden of environmen-
tal regulation falls on importers as well. Provided these conditions are met, the costs of environmental
policy will fall with trade intensity. Therefore, stringent environmental policy will be easier for smaller
than for large countries because ceteris paribus trade intensity is smaller for the latter. This beneficial
aspect of policymaking in open economies is coined ’regulatory decoupling’ by McAusland and Mil-
limet (2011). Related themes are explored by Pflüger (2001), who finds that openness leads to stricter
environmental regulation via consumer price spillovers in a model of monopolistic competition, and
Haupt (2006), who extends this work to a setting with an endogenous number of varieties. We differen-
tiate from the beforementioned contributions by connecting the tax-exporting motive to the degree of
vertical integration and examining the consequences for (green) welfare.
With respect to our model structure, there exists a substantial literature on vertical integration, in-
termediate goods and international trade. Yi (2003) uses a two-country dynamic Ricardian trade model
to explain how trading (un)processed intermediate goods back and forth between countries can lead
to magnification of the impact of tariffs on final goods prices. We show that this intermediate goods
multiplier has important consequences for the effects of environmental policy. Two characteristics of
a vertically integrated world economy, as in Yi (2003), stand out. First of all, vertical specialization
requires countries to specialize in certain stages of the production sequence of a final good. Second,
Hummels et al. (2001) note that vertical specialization occurs when imported intermediate goods are
used to produce export goods. We refer to these features of the vertically integrated world economy
respectively as (i) supply chain specialization and (ii) the dependence of exports on imported inputs.
Here we take a simple approach to the vertically integrated world economy. First, we assume that each
country produces a unique set of tradable intermediate goods. In turn, the total set of world interme-
diates can be combined to form a composite intermediate good. In this way we capture supply chain
specialization. Second, we assume that tradable intermediate goods are produced with domestic labor
and the composite intermediate good, thereby capturing the dependence of exports on imported inputs.
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3 The Model
The world consists of N countries indexed by j = 1, 2, .., N. In each country there are three sectors, pro-
ducing (1) tradable intermediate goods, (2) a composite intermediate good and (3) a non-tradable final
consumption good. In this respect the production structure is identical to Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
We extend their production structure by assuming that a composite intermediate good is not only used
as an input to the final goods sector, but also serves as an input in the production of tradable interme-
diates. In this sense the model is similar to Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare
(2010), who also assume an international input-output (I-O) structure.1
There exists a continuum of tradable intermediate goods with mass M. We assume that country
j produces a unique subset nj from this set of varieties with ∑
j=N
j=1 nj = M and nj \ nk = ∅ for 8j, k
conditional on j 6= k. Again, we assume symmetry such that nj = n = MN . The assumption that each
country produces a unique set of intermediates is simplifying, but captures the idea of supply chain
specialization, a critical feature of the vertically integrated economy model.
There is only one (primary) factor of production, labor L, that is supplied inelastically and immobile
between countries, but perfectly mobile domestically. Countries engage in two-way trade in intermedi-
ate products in order to produce a composite intermediate good. Each country produces a non-tradable
final consumption good using labour and the composite intermediate good. The composite interme-
diate good is also used to produce the tradable intermediates (input-output). We assume that the pro-
duction process of tradable intermediates is polluting and that abatement can reduce the emission in-
tensity of production. The model is different from most trade models by assuming (i) a large number
of symmetric countries, (ii) trade in intermediate goods, (iii) an I-O structure and (iv) emissions from
the production of intermediate goods. Assumptions (ii)-(iv) capture our focus on a vertically integrated
world economy whereas assumption (i) is adopted because it simplifies the analysis considerably.
3.1 Welfare and Consumption
The size of the world population equals Lw. We assume that each individual supplies one unit of labour
and that all countries are identical in terms of population size. Under full employment total effective
labor supply in each country then equals L
w
N  L. Per capita welfare u in country j is determined by
consumption and pollution in the following manner:
u(cj, Zj) =
cj1 σ
1  σ   ηZj , σ > 0 (1)
where cj  Cj/L is per-capita consumption of the aggregate consumption good in country j and Zj is the
total pollution flow experienced by citizens in country j. Pollution emitted and pollution experienced
by a particular country are not necessarily equal due to spillovers between countries. Let φij denote
the fraction of pollution emitted by country i that spills over to country j. Then pollution experienced
by country j is defined as Zj = nzj + ∑i 6=j φijnzi where nzi is pollution generated by production of
intermediate goods in country i. The marginal damage from (transboundary) pollution η is assumed
to be constant. In what follows we will also assume that the spillovers between countries are pairwise
symmetric and equal across all country pairs, that is, φij = φji = φ for all i, j where i 6= j. The special
cases of φ = 0 and φ = 1 are used to denote respectively the degree of spillovers associated with local
pollutants (sulfur) and global pollutants (carbon).
1Note that Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) do not consider optimal policies.
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3.2 Production of Intermediate Goods
The production of tradable intermediate goods requires the input of labour and a composite inter-
mediate good. This last assumption captures the idea that a vertically integrated world economy is
characterized by an (international) I-O structure. Under constant returns to scale and imposing a Cobb-
Douglas functional form, the production function of a typical tradable intermediate good in country j
is given by
yj = (1  θ j)ljyβxjy1 β (2)
where yj refers to net output, xjy represents the input of the composite tradable intermediate good in
the production of a typical intermediate in country j and ljy is the amount of labour employed in the
production of a typical variety in country j. With each country producing n intermediates, which are
produced with identical technologies (see 2), we can define Xjy  nxjy and Ljy  nljy as respectively the
total input of the composite intermediate good and labour in the production of tradable intermediate
goods.
The production of one net unit of output generates e(θ j) units of pollution, where θ j is the fraction
of gross output of the intermediate good used for abatement in country j.3 Note that this implies that
(1  θ j) in (2) is the ratio of net output over gross output. Following Copeland and Taylor (2003) we
assume a simple iso-elastic specification for the emission intensity, e(θ j)  (1  θ j) 1 αα with 0 < α < 1.
Total emissions zj of a typical variety in country j then equal:
zj = e(θ j)yj (3)
A change in θ j will now affect zj in three different ways: once directly through ej, once directly via the
reduction in net output yj and indirectly via the aggregate intermediate good term xjy1 β. Alternatively,
one might write total pollution of a typical variety in country j as zj = (1   θ j) 1α ljyβxjy1 β, where
(1  θ j) 1α represents the emission intensity per gross unit of output. We assume the government is able
to indirectly control the intensity of abatement θ j by imposing an emission standard sj = e(θ j) (firm
standard), where θ j is uniquely determined by θ j = e 1(sj). An increase in θ j works as an increase in
the net unit-input requirement. The emission intensity per unit of output is strictly decreasing in the
production standard, that is, e0(θ j) < 0. In the remaining of this chapter we will always refer to θ j when
discussing the stringency of environmental policy in country j.
The composite intermediate good is produced under constant returns to scale with a roundabout
production technology using all available intermediate goods, which are imported from world markets.
Total production of the composite intermediate good Xj follows a CES function,
Xj = (
N
∑
i=1
ny
ε 1
ε
ij )
ε
ε 1 , ε > 1 (4)
where yij is the input of a typical intermediate good from country i in country j, representing an import
in case i 6= j. The parameter ε is the elasticity of substitution between tradable intermediates. It also
represents the price elasticity of foreign demand for the country’s products and Acemoglu and Ventura
(2002) interpret the inverse of this elasticity as a measure of the degree of specialization.
Markets for tradable intermediate goods are characterized by a large number of producers and a
large number of buyers from the final goods sector (and the composite intermediate goods sector), and
are therefore subject to perfect competition. Perfect competition and constant returns to scale together
3The assumption that dirty sectors use a fraction of their own output to abate pollution is common in the literature on trade
and the environment. A notable expection is Greaker & Rosenknut (2008). Greaker & Rosenknut (2008) introduce a seperate
upstream pollution abatement sector in a partial equilibrium trade model.
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imply that unit cost pricing prevails:
pj =
1
ψ
1
1  θ j wj
βPX1 β (5)
where ψ  ββ(1  β)1 β, wj represents the domestic wage rate and PX is the price of the composite
intermediate good. Profit maximization by producers of the composite intermediate good results in the
following price PX which due to free trade is independent of j:
PX = [
i=N
∑
i=1
npi1 ε]
1
1 ε (6)
As can be seen from (2) and (5), a direct consequence of a lower emission standard θ is a decrease in
"total factor productivity" (Hicks neutral technical change) and an increase in the price of net output.
3.3 Production of the Final Good
The non-tradable consumption good is produced with (i) the composite intermediate good and (ii)
labour. The final good production function reads:
Cj = χLjC1 τXjCτ (7)
where Cj is the output of the consumption good, XjC is the input of the aggregate intermediate good,
LjC is the input of labour in the production of the consumption good and χ  ττ(1  τ)1 τ represents
a parameter used for normalization.
With perfectly competitive markets the price of the final good is given by:
pjC = wj1 τPXτ (8)
Market clearing for the composite intermediate good in each country requires Xj = XjC + Xjy. Next,
we turn to solve for factor market equilibrium from the balanced trade condition.
3.4 Global Environmental Quality
To derive total pollution emitted and "received" in a given country, we use the definition of pollution
Zj = nzj + φn∑i 6=j zi, and substitute for total pollution per variety zj from (3). This leads to the follow-
ing specification for total pollution:
Zj = n
"
e(θ j)(1  θ j)ljyβxjy1 β + φ∑
i 6=j
e(θi)(1  θi)liyβxiy1 β
#
(9)
Total pollution depends on environmental policy at home and abroad and the inputs of labor and the
composite intermediate good in the production of intermediate goods. Once we have solved for the
market equilibrium of the model, we will return to an in-depth analysis of (9), where we will take into
account the endogeneity of the various inputs. As we will explain, the IO-structure of our model is of
particular interest here.
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3.5 Market Equilibrium and Trade Balance
In equilibrium the sum of labour employed in the production of tradable intermediates Ljy and the
non-tradable consumption good LjC should equate the supply of labour:
L = Ljy + LjC (10)
Let us define E as world expenditures on intermediates. Demand for each tradable intermediate qj is of
the constant elasticity form,
qj = pj εPε 1X E = pj
 εE (11)
The second equality in (11) follows after taking PX as the numeraire. Next, we examine in more detail
world expenditures on intermediates. To this end, let us define nominal income in country j as Ij = wjL.
Then in all countries (i) final goods producers spend a fraction τ of total costs on intermediates and (ii)
intermediate goods producers also spend a fraction 1  β of total costs on the aggregate intermediate
good such that E = τ Iw + (1  β)(∑j=Nj=1 npjqj) where Iw  ∑
j=N
j=1 Ij represents world income. Equilib-
rium in the final goods market requires that consumption expenditures equal nominal income, that is,
pjCCj = Ij.
Next, we want to rewrite (11) in order to obtain the balanced trade condition. In the appendix we
display two alternative methods to derive this condition. Let use the abbreviations IMj and EXj to
refer to imports and exports of intermediate goods by country j. With n intermediate produced by each
country and a total number of N   1 trading partners, imports and exports are defined as:
IMj = n(p1y1j + p2y2j + ...+ pj 1yj 1,j + pj+1yj+1,j + ...+ pNyNj) (12)
EXj = n(pjyj1 + pjyj2 + ...+ pjyj,j 1 + pjyj,j+1 + ...+ pjyjN) (13)
Using these definitions of imports and exports (12)-(13) we can show that IMj = τβ Ij(1  
Ij
Iw ) and
EXj = np1 εj
τ
β (1 
Ij
Iw )I
w, where the import ratio or export ratio
IMj
Ij
=
EXj
Ij
= τβ (1 
Ij
Iw ) is decreasing
in relative income
Ij
Iw . Equating imports and exports then leads to the balanced trade condition:
Ij = npj1 ε Iw (14)
where we divided by
IMj
Ij
on both sides of the equation. Thus, the left-hand side and right-hand side
of (14) represent respectively imports and exports divided by the import ratio. Under balanced trade
the import ratio is half the trade intensity, which equals υj  EXj+IMjIj = 2
τ
β (1 
Ij
Iw )
4. With symmetric
countries it then follows immediately that υ = 2 N 1N
τ
β . Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) obtain υ = 2τ,
which can be obtained as a special case in our model when β = 1 (no I-O structure) and lim N ! ∞5.
4 Environmental Policy, Terms-of-Trade and I-O linkages
The division of the world into N symmetric countries allows us to define N as the ’degree of decen-
tralization’ or, alternatively, define 1/N as ’the degree of centralization. The degree of decentralization
under symmetry ranges from 1 to ∞, which corresponds respectively to a situation of autarky (N = 1)
4One can now also show that 1  β is a measures of vertical specialization, e.g. the degree to which exports are produced with
imports, since

Xjy
Xj

IMj
EXj
= 1  β.
5Similarly, "openness" in our setting equals N 1N
τ
β instead of τ in the model by Acemoglu & Ventura (2002).
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and the small open economy case (N ! ∞). In what follows we will refer to small (large) countries
when analyzing a situation where N is a relatively large (small) number, such that population size per
country L
w
N is relatively small (large). Thus, decentralization refers to a world where the number of
countries N is large, population size per country is small and trade intensity τβ
N 1
N per country is high
(and converges to τβ in the small open economy case). Next, we analyze the effects of a unilateral mar-
ginal change in domestic environmental policy on wages and prices. The results obtained will prove to
be useful when deriving the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
We use subscript A to denote variables of the country that marginally changes its environmental
policy and we use subscript B to denote all other countries. Ex-ante countries are asymmetric so we
write world income as Iw = IA + (N   1)IB = wAL+ (N   1)wBL. From the point of view of country
A all other countries are identical, hence the grouping of other countries under B. Analogously with
the definitions related to income, prices of intermediate goods in country A and the other countries are
given by pA = 1ψ
1
1 θA wA
β and pB = 1ψ
1
1 θB wB
β respectively. Substitution of these equations into (6)
and (14) gives us the following set of two equations in fwA, wB, θA, θBg:
1 = n

wAβ
1  θA
1 ε
+ (N   1)n

wBβ
1  θB
1 ε
(15)
wAL = n

wAβ
1  θA
1 ε
[wAL+ (N   1)wBL] (16)
To analyze the effect of a marginal change in the emission standard on domestic and foreign, we differ-
entiate the price index numeraire equation (15) and the balanced trade equation (16) with respect to θA,
the own wage rate wA and the foreign wage rates wB while taking θB as constant (see the appendix for
a full derivation).
Define p0  w1 θ as the ’raw price’ of the intermediate good when there is no I-O structure (β = 1)
and define the effective price elasticity with respect to environmental policy εP as εP  limN >∞( dpAdθA
1 θA
pA
).
Using this definition we find, as shown in the appendix, that εP = 11+β(ε 1) . We are now ready to state
the first set of results, all related to a unilateral marginal change in environmental policy:
Result 1 More stringent environmental policy reduces the domestic wage rate,
dwj
dθ j
=
26664 1β (1  1N )εP| {z }
ToT
  1
β|{z}
TFP
37775 p0 = (a  b)p0 < 0,
via a negative TFP effect ( bp0 < 0) and a positive terms-of-trade effect (ap0 > 0), where a  1β (1  1N )εP =
1
β
N 1
N
1
1+β(ε 1) and b  1β denote respectively the terms-of-trade coefficient and the TFP coefficient. Foreign
wages are affected as well via terms-of-trade spillovers, dwidθ j =  
1
N 1 ap
0 < 0. Prices of intermediate goods
increase at home and decrease abroad,
dpj
dθ j
= βa p1 θ > 0 and
dpi
dθ j
=  β 1N 1 a p1 θ < 0.
Environmental policy affects the return to labour via two different channels. First, there is a TFP
effect. We use the term TFP effect, because producers require more inputs to produce one net unit of
output if the stringency of environmental policy increases. A higher standard effectively works as a
negative TFP effect that lowers the real wage, ddθ j (
wj
pjC
) = ddθ (wj)
τ = τwτ 1j
dwj
dθ j
< 0, where the negative
sign follows directly from result 1. Second, since countries produce a unique set of varieties a part of
the costs of environmental policy is translated into higher prices, i.e. positive terms-of-trade effects.
The degree to which depends on the elasticity εP and the export share of production ( N 1N ). The overall
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impact of these two effects on the wage rate is unambiguously negative since the positive terms-of-trade
effect is always overwhelmed by the negative TFP effect (Result 1).
In what way do I-O linkages change the impact of environmental policy on prices of wages? Con-
sider first the case of a large number of small open economies where N ! ∞. For a small open economy
one can ignore changes in foreign wages when determining the impact of a change in θA on wA6. The
introduction of I-O linkages changes the price elasticity with respect to environmental policy εP. Note
that for β = 1 we find that εP equals the inverse of the elasticity of demand ε. Therefore one might
interpret εP as the inverse of the effective price elasticity of demand εD, that is, εD  1εP = 1+ β(ε  1),
where effective refers to the indirect changes in demand that result from the interlinkages between pro-
duction of intermediate goods and the composite intermediate good. So why is the effective elasticity
of demand smaller in the presence of an I-O structure? Intermediate goods are now even more "impor-
tant" than before, as evident by the share 1  β that intermediate good producers spend themselves on
other intermediate goods. Thus, with I-O linkages it becomes more difficult to substitute away towards
other (local) inputs.
To yield further insights into the general case with N 2 [1,∞), we can can rearrange dwjdθ j = (a  b)p0
to highlight the separate effects of N and β:
dwj
dθ j
=

 p0 + 1
ε
p0

1+
(1  β)(ε  1)
1+ β(ε  1)

| {z }
small open economy
  1
N
1
β
1
ε
p0

ε
1+ β(ε  1)

(17)
where the first term on the left-hand side coincides with the effect for a small open economy (N ! ∞).
In the small open economy the opportunity cost of abatement equals  p, that is, the value of foregone
output. There is also a terms-of-trade effect that depends on the inverse of the elasticity of demand
(see Johnson (1953)). This terms-of-trade effect is strictly proportional to 1ε when there are no I-O link-
ages (β = 1). Large countries have to take into account that they consume a non-negligible portion of
domestically produced dirty intermediates, hence the second term on the right-hand side of (17). Con-
clusively, the marginal effect of abatement on the domestic wage rate can be decomposed in a TFP effect
(invariant to the degree of centralization) and a terms-of-trade effect which explains that, dependent on
country size, countries may export a part of the costs of environmental policy by imposing higher prices
(
dpj
dθ j
> 0 and dpidθ j < 0). Furthermore,
Result 2 Boomerang mechanism of environmental policy.
The terms-of-trade effect and the TFP effect are monotonically increasing in the so-called ’intermediate goods mul-
tiplier’ 1β 2 [1,∞).
A useful interpretation of β can be given by noting that 1/β represents the intermediate goods mul-
tiplier of environmental policy7. Intuitively, a higher standard in country A means less production of
the intermediate goods produced in A. Ceteris paribus, a lower supply of intermediate goods from A
will also lower the total supply of the composite intermediate good. A decrease in the supply of the
composite intermediate good then feeds back into the intermediate goods sector and lowers output in
this sector. Diminished output of intermediate goods sets in motion a new round with reduced outputs
in all sectors. This cycle will repeat itself again and again. The culmination of this cycle is the geometric
6In practice this means that one can differentiate the balanced trade condition (16) with respect to θA and wA, while ignoring
the price index equation (15).
7In an I-O model of a small open economy with multiple factors of production, Jones (2010) explains how the simple I-O
multiplier is a special case of a general, more complex multiplier where industries differ in the degree to which rely on the inputs
of intermediate goods. Furthermore, using the 2006 edition of the OECD I-O database he concludes that for most countries "one
over one minus the intermediate goods share" represents a good approximation to the true multiplier.
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sequence 1+ (1  β) + (1  β)2 + .. = 11 (1 β) = 1β  1 which holds for any β 2 (0, 1]. We find that
both the positive terms-of-trade effect and the negative TFP effect of a higher standard are proportional
to the intermediate goods multiplier (Result 2). The explanation for this multiplier follows directly
from the previous argument. A stricter emission standard means that more gross output is directed to
cleaning-up activities, i.e. abatement, which ceteris paribus leads to a lower supply of the intermediate
good. In turn, this lowered supply means less of the composite intermediate good as well, which feeds
back in the global production process of all intermediate goods and so on.
Result 3 Terms-of-trade effects of stricter environmental policy are larger when the degree of decentralization
increases, dadN =
d
dN (
1
β
N 1
N εP) =
1
β
1
N2 εP > 0. Stated otherwise, the beneficial terms-of-trade effect that lowers
the costs of environmental policy is increasing with the number of countries.
In the context of traditional trade theories based on (comparative advantage and) homogeneous
goods it is well-known that big countries have an incentive to use environmental policy to influence the
terms-of-trade. An importer of dirty goods can use an environmental tax that exceeds marginal damage
to increase the terms-of-trade vis-à-vis dirty goods exporters. A surprising implication of our set-up is
that terms-of-trade effects are actually smaller not larger for big countries.8 To see why, note that the
terms-of-trade coefficient, a = 1β
N 1
N εP, is increasing in the number of countries N. This property is
not unique to our setting and applies to other models, such as the monopolistic competition model of
Krugman (1980), as well. With an increase in trade intensity a greater part of the costs of environmental
policy will be borne by foreign consumers via higher product prices (result 3). In other words, if a large
part of production is consumed outside the country the incentive for domestic policymakers to impose
more stringent environmental policy on domestic firms increases. Then, for any required reduction in
the level of emissions, the domestic costs are decreasing with trade intensity.
5 Global Pollution and I-O linkages
5.1 Determinants of Global Pollution
In this section we want to clarify the relationship between I-O linkages and global pollution. To do so,
we derive closed-form solutions to the production of (i) the composite intermediate good and (ii) the
intermediate good. Demand for intermediate i by country j follows directly from (11) and is given by
yij = p εi Xj = p
 ε
i
τ
β Ij, where the second equality follows from Xj = Xjy + XjC =
1 β
β τ Ij + τ Ij =
τ
β Ij
(see the derivation of the balanced trade condition in the appendix). Subsequently, world demand for
each intermediate good equals yi = ∑Nj=1 yij = p
 ε
i
τ
β I
w. These two demand functions can then be used
to derive that
λj 
yij
yi
=
Ij
Iw
(18)
which tells us that a country’s consumption share (or import share) of a typical intermediate good λj
equals relative income
Ij
Iw . In equilibrium we have Ij = I and I
w = NI such that λj = 1N . The next step
is to substitute for yij = λjyi in (4) in order to obtain Xj = nxj = λj(∑i ny
ε 1
ε
i )
ε
ε 1 . Then we substitute
for all yi from (2) in this result, using xjy =
1 β
n Xj and
Xi
Xj
= λiλj , and rearrange:
Xj =
n
1  β

1  β
n
λjGj
 1
β
ly = λj
n
1  β

1  β
n
G
 1
β
ly (19)
8Remember, when referring to large countries we refer to a world with a small number of countries.
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where Gj  (∑i n((1   θi)( λiλj )1 β)
ε 1
ε )
ε
ε 1 = λ
β 1
j G. Equation (19) determines Xj as a function of
relative income, labour endowment (via ly = τLn ) and a world aggregate TFP term G. This composite
term G represents an income weighted average of global environmental policies. A stricter domestic
pollution standard spills over to other countries via this composite technology term.
Next, we substitute xjy =
1 β
n Xj, (19) and (2) into (3) in order to derive total pollution per variety:
zj = e(θ j)(1  θ j)
"
λj

1  β
n
G
 1
β
#1 β
ly (20)
Under full symmetry we can write (20) as z(θ) =
_
z(1   θ)Φ, where _z 

1
N
1 β
n M
ε
ε 1
 1 β
β ly and
Φ  (1 α)β+α[1 (1 τ)(1 σ)]αβ > 0. One could interpret Φ loosely as the elasticity of (global) pollution
with respect to the share of inputs used for productive purposes (i.e. non-abatement activities), that
is, dzd(1 θ)
1 θ
z = Φ. Finally, we retrieve (world) pollution by substitution of (20) into (9) and using
nly = τ L
w
N :
Zj =
1
N
"
e(θ j)(1  θ j)
 
λj
1 β
+ φ
 
∑
i 6=j
e(θi)(1  θi) (λi)1 β
!#
1  β
n
G
 1 β
β
τLw (21)
Equation (21) shows clearly how pollution Zj depends (indirectly) on global environmental policies and
the world income distribution, that is, Zj = Zj(θ1, θ2, .., θN ,λ1,λ2, ..,λN). Using the tools developed
by Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Copeland and Taylor (1994) we can qualitatively describe the
determinants of pollution:
1. Scale effect. An increase in world population Lw leads to a proportional increase in world pollution.
2. Composition effect. (i) Since only the production of the tradable intermediate goods generates pollu-
tion, τ can be interpreted as the expenditure share on dirty goods. (ii) The term
 
λj
1 β captures a
global composition effect : production of the (composite) intermediate good in country j expands
with relative income.
3. Technique effect. (i) A higher standard θi decreases the emission intensity e(θi)(1  θi) per gross unit
of output. (ii) Global TFP in the intermediate goods sector, as measured by G, depends negatively
on an income weighted-average of environmental policies.
Note that I-O linkages thus give rise to two additional effects, a novel composition effect and a novel
technique effect.
5.2 Weak Links & Negative Carbon Leakage
Now that we have determined an expression for equilibrium pollution in the presence of I-O linkages
(20), we are interested in the impact of a unilateral marginal change in environmental policy on equilib-
rium pollution, both at home and abroad. From the perspective of the mitigating country we can write
domestic pollution and foreign pollution, using (20), as:
zA = e(θA)(1  θA)
"
λA

1  β
n
G
 1
β
#1 β
ly (22)
zB = e(θB)(1  θB)
"
λB

1  β
n
G
 1
β
#1 β
ly
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where G = (n((1   θA)(λA)1 β + (N   1)(1   θB)(λB)1 β) ε 1ε )
ε
ε 1 , λA =
IA
Iw and λB =
IB
Iw . Let us
define carbon leakage as the increase in emissions outside the country taking actions related to mit-
igation and define the following elasticities, εz,θ    dzjdθ j
1 θ j
zj
= 1α (1   α(1   β)(a   b)) > 0 and
εlz,θ    dzidθ j
1 θ j
zi
= (1   β) aN 1 > 0, where superscript l is a mnemonic for leakage9. Now totally
differentiate (22), subject to the definitions of G, λA and λB, with respect to θA, wA and wB, taking θB
as given. Even though income shares will be independent of environmental policy in equilibrium due
to our symmetric set-up (λj = 1N ), ex-ante countries will take into account that they can affect relative
income.10 We can then state the following result:
Proposition 1 Under a unilateral marginal increase in the stringency of environmental policy:
1) pollution is affected by (i) a weak link effect and (ii) a global technology effect. The weak link effect decreases
pollution at home but increases pollution abroad. The global technology effect decreases pollution in all countries.
2) pollution is reduced at home, that is,
dzj
dθ j
=  εz,θ z1 θ < 0.
3) (carbon) leakage is negative, dzidθ j =  εlz,θ
z
1 θ < 0 if and only if β < 1. There is zero leakage (
dzi
dθ j
= 0) if there
is no I-O structure (β = 1).
To understand these results, consider the following interpretation of the global technology effect.
Like physical capital, intermediate goods are produced inputs. If a country reduces its supply of in-
termediate goods, imports of these goods by trading partners will fall. This reduction of imports rep-
resents a reduction of inputs and ceteris paribus output in the importing country must decrease. As a
result, pollution in the intermediate goods sector diminishes. Since the global technology effect affects
all countries alike, domestic environmental policy thus results in a positive spillback effect in the form
of reduced pollution abroad.
The weak link effect on the other hand describes a substitution effect and induces more (less) pollu-
tion abroad (at home): if productivity in the intermediate goods sector in one country decreases, then it
follows from (19) that the ’intake’ of intermediate goods in all other countries increases since it is more
efficient to ’fuel’ the more productive sectors. Thus, the weak link effect tells us that a decrease in the
supply of intermediate goods from one country is softened by an increase in supply abroad11.
Taken together, pollution decreases at home since both the weak link effect and the global technology
effect diminish pollution in the mitigating country. In the rest of the world the weak link effect raises
pollution, but the global technology effect reduces pollution. The net effect, however, on pollution in
the rest of the world is always negative.
Unilateral policy resulting in negative carbon leakage is an interesting outcome. Most studies on
climate change policies in open economies find the opposite result of positive leakage. As far as we
know, Fullerton et al. (2011) is the only other paper that finds negative leakage12. In their model it
results from a so-called abatement resource effect; by increasing its demand for the internationally mo-
bile clean factor of production, the regulated sector in the mitigating country crowds out production in
the unregulated sector abroad. Similar to Fullerton et al. (2011) we do not claim that carbon leakage
actually is negative. The results obtained here merely illustrate that conventional models might have
overlooked certain channels. Note that one could easily introduce positive carbon leakage by modi-
9Note that these elasticities are evaluated in the symmetric equilibrium.
10Only in a world with small open economies (N ! ∞) will policymakers ignore this effect.
11Jones (2011) uses the phrase ’weak link’ in a closed economy I-O model to explain how complementarities in a production
chain can explain income differences between countries via misallocations of production factors. The weak link effect described
here is somewhat different in that (i) we focus on international I-O links and (ii) we assume that intermediates are imperfect
substitutes.
12In contrast to our study, Fullerton et al. (2011) do not consider strategic interaction between countries nor do they derive
welfare results in the context of non-cooperative policies.
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fying our basic set-up. For example, one could assume pollution in other sectors or assume a more
complicated production function for final goods.
6 Environmental Policy in the Global Economy
6.1 A Variety of Externalities
Before we analyze the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum in more detail, it is helpful to list the
various externalities that are present in our framework:
1. Local pollution externality. Firms do no take into account, unless corrective policy is in place, that
the production of intermediate goods pollutes the (local) environment.
2. Transboundary pollution externality. Firms (and governments) do not take into account that pollu-
tion spillovers from domestic production reduce welfare in other countries.
3. Terms-of-trade externality. Governments take into account that a higher standard raises prices of
inputs for domestic producers, but ignore the fact that price increases also fall on intermediate
good producers and final good producers in other countries. Thus, they ignore the negative ram-
ifications of higher prices on welfare in other countries.
4. Spillback externality. A higher domestic standard affects pollution in the rest of the world through
the weak link effect and the global technology effect (see proposition 1). Governments do not
internalize the implications of these indirect effects for welfare in other countries.
Given these different types of externalities, how then is the non-cooperative standard distorted?
First of all, the implications of (1)-(2) are obvious. In the absence of global coordination on environ-
mental policy, (1)-(2) tends to result in too much pollution from a social planner perspective. Second,
ignoring price spillovers from domestic environmental policy can actually lead to too little pollution (3).
Third and finally, (4) needs some additional explanation before proceeding to the analysis of the Nash
equilibrium. The impact of environmental policy on the productivity term G in the tradable goods sec-
tor can be categorized as a negative technology spillover. This negative technology spillover will ceteris
paribus decrease pollution in other countries, which in turn lowers pollution spillovers to the domestic
country. We refer to this additional effect as a spillback effect, similar to Ogawa and Wildasin (2009),
and it tends to raise the optimal standard. However, since countries will only internalize this spillback
effect in as much it lowers their own pollution damages there is a tendency for too much pollution13.
For future reference, we loosely define free riding as the joint incentive underlying pollution policy as
shaped by both the spillback externality and the transboundary pollution externality.
6.2 The Social Optimum
Before proceeding to the analysis of the social optimum we feel some remarks with respect to the utility
function are in order. In this section and the next we focus on solutions with log-utility (σ = 1). Under
different circumstances (σ 6= 1), there is a very strong tendency for the (non-cooperative) standard to
increase when β decreases due to income effects14. Since we are not directly interested in the impact of
13In this sense, the spillback externality can also be interpreted as an extension to the transboundary pollution externality.
14To see why, we derive an implicit equation for the wage rate as a function of domestic environmental policy and foreign
wages by rewriting the balanced trade condition (14) to:
(wj)1+β(ε 1)   n(1  θ j)ε 1wj = n(1  θ j)ε 1(∑
i 6=j
wi) (23)
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income on the stringency of environmental regulation, we decide to adopt a log-utility function such
that the marginal cost of meeting the domestic standard (MAC) will not depend on the wage rate.
Let us define global welfare by uw  ∑Nj=1 uj. Then substitution of (1), cj =
wj
pjC
= wτj and (21) into
uw leads to
Vw =
N
∑
i=1
log wτi   η
N
∑
i=1
Zi(θ1, θ2, .., θN ,λ1,λ2, ..,λN) (25)
To ease comparison with the non-cooperative equilibrium, we decide to analyze the market implemen-
tation of the social optimum where each country selects a standard that equates the social marginal cost
of abatement to the social marginal benefit of abatement15. We maximize (25) with respect to θ j, and
rearrange to obtain:
 τ( 1
wj
dwj
dθ j
+ (N   1) 1
wi
dwi
dθ j
)| {z }
MACSj
+ ηn
 
dZj
dθ j
+ (N   1)dZi
dθ j
!
| {z }
 MBSj
= 0 (26)
where
dZj
dθ j
=
dzj
dθ j
+ φ(N  1) dzidθ j and
dZi
dθ j
= dzidθ j
+ φ
dzj
dθ j
+ φ(N  2) dzidθ j . The first term on the left-hand side
represents the social marginal cost of meeting the standard in util terms with a minus sign in front of
it, that is, MACSj =  τ 1wj
dwj
dθ j
. A higher standard reduces wages at home and abroad, thereby reducing
consumption and utility in all countries. The second term represents the marginal benefit of setting a
standard or the marginal reduction in pollution damages from a higher standard. The marginal benefit
of setting a higher standard in country j results from less pollution damages at home, which consist of
a direct effect via
dzj
dθ j
and a spillback effect via φ(N   1) dzidθ j . In addition there are benefits in all other
N   1 countries consisting of a direct leakage effect via dzidθ j and indirectly due to various spillovers via
φ
dzj
dθ j
+ φ(N   2) dzidθ j . Before we present the solution to the optimal standard in the social optimum θ
S,
we analyze the non-cooperative problem.
6.3 The Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
For the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium the problem of country j = 1, .., N is to maximize Vj =
log wτj   ηZj(θ1, θ2, .., θN ,λ1,λ2, ..,λN) with respect to θ j taking the standards set by other countries as
given. The solution θNCj satisfies the following first-order condition
 τ 1
wj
dwj
dθ j| {z }+
MACj
ηn
dZj
dθ j| {z }
 MBj
= 0 (27)
for all j = 1, .., N with
dZj
dθ j
=
dzj
dθ j
+ φ(N   1) dzidθ j . Like the social planner, each country will set the mar-
ginal cost of meeting the domestic standard (first term) equal to the marginal benefits of meeting the
When countries are fully symmetric wages must equalize and (23) boils down to:
w = [(1  θ)M 1ε 1 ] 1β (24)
Keep in mind that w does not depend on σ. Now from (24) note first that limβ!0 w = limβ!0[(1  θ)M
1
ε 1 ]
1
β = +∞ if (1 
θ)M
1
ε 1 > 1. Provided this is the case one also finds, using (1), that limβ!0 ∂u∂c = (wj)
 στ = 0. In words, the marginal utility of
consumption goes to zero. As we will see later on, unless we take a log-functional form for utility, the marginal cost of abatement
will then go to zero as well when we strengthen the international I-O structure (lower β).
15Note that in the presence of international trade it is not sufficient to use private marginal cost of abatement (as it would be
under autarky). Via trade a part of the costs from environmental policy automatically spill over to other countries in the form of
higher prices.
15
domestic standard (second and third term) when determining the optimal standard. Unlike the social
planner, however, individual countries do not internalize the various externalities as listed at the begin-
ning of this section. Now let us introduce the following notation:
Definition 1. (i) In the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium the marginal cost of meeting the domestic stan-
dard and the marginal benefits of meeting the domestic standard in each country can be defined as functions of
N, that is, MAC(N) = ΩC(N) 11 θ and MB(N) = Ω
B(N)(1  θ)Φ 1, where ΩC(N)   τ(a   b) and
ΩB(N)  ηn(εz,θ + φ(N   1)εlz,θ)
_
z denote the MAC-coefficient and MB-coefficient respectively.
(ii) For the social optimum we define MACS(N) = ΩCS (N)
1
1 θ and MB
S(N) = ΩBS (N)(1  θ)Φ 1 withΩCS =
ΩC(1) = τb and ΩBS (N) = Ω
B(N) + (N   1)ΩBl (N), where ΩBl (N)  ηn
h
φ(εz,θ + (N   2)εlz,θ) + εlz,θ
i _
z.
From (26) and (27), while making use of definition 1, we can now obtain closed-form solutions for
θS and θNC:
θNC = 1 

ΩC(N)
ΩB(N)
 1
Φ
, θS = 1 
"
ΩC(1)
ΩB(N) + (N   1)ΩBl (N)
# 1
Φ
(28)
In turn, these solutions can be used to solve for ZS and ZNC by substituting from (28) into (21). The
solutions under (28) satisfy the following properties16:
Proposition 2 (i) Under transboundary pollution (φ > 0) we find θS ? θNC , (N   1)ΩBl (N)ΩC(N) ?
aτΩB(N).
(ii) Under purely local pollution (φ = 0) we have θS < θNC.
(iii) There exists a unique
_
φ  1N 1
aεz,θ+(a b)(N 1)εlz,θ
(b a)(εz,θ+(N 2)εlz,θ) aεlz,θ
such that θS ? θNC for all φ ?
_
φ provided
_
φ 2 (0, 1].
Proposition 3 For φ < (>)
_
φ we find that green welfare is higher (lower) in the non-cooperative equilibrium
than in the social optimum.
Both a race to the bottom type of result, which is typical for the tax competition literature, and a
race to the top result, where standards are actually higher in the non-cooperative solution than in the
social optimum, are feasible depending on various parameter values. A more detailed examination of
the condition under (i) might prove to be insightful here. A comparison of the two solutions under (28)
tells us that the marginal cost of meeting the standard are smaller under non-cooperation than in the
social optimum, which is strictly due to the terms-of-trade externality. Based on this argument alone,
the non-cooperative standard should be more stringent than the standard in the social optimum. On
the other hand, the marginal benefits of meeting the environmental standard are larger in the social
optimum, which is due to the internalization of the transboundary pollution externality and the spill-
back externality. These effects work through the term (N  1)ΩBl (N) and they tend to make the socially
optimal standard higher than the non-cooperative standard. Thus, when the terms-of-trade external-
ity overwhelms the free-riding externality we obtain a race to the top result (θS < θNC) otherwise we
obtain a race to the bottom result (θS > θNC).
If pollution spillovers between countries are absent (φ = 0) non-cooperation always leads to a race to
the top. How can we explain this result using our list of cross-country externalities? First, note that free-
riding between nation states does not play any role when pollution is purely local. Second, under non-
cooperation countries do not internalize the pollution spillback effects from a stringent standard that
16Note that θS is still a function of N since the marginal benefits of abatement depend on N: we have assumed that φ 2 [0, 1]
such that ceteris paribus a more decentralized world leads to lower damages.
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positively affect welfare in other countries; these spillback effects are more important when I-O linkages
are strong and the number of countries increases. Third, countries impose production standards to raise
the terms-of-trade. It can be shown that the terms-of-trade effect always outweighs the spillback effect
and a race to the top ensues.
Part (iii) of proposition 2 shows that there exists a threshold value 0 <
_
φ  1 for the spillover
coefficient such that for all φ < (>)
_
φ we obtain a race to the top (race to the bottom) result. Although
it is difficult to prove analytically, numerical analysis indicates that
_
φ is decreasing in β. In words, the
strength of the I-O structure of the world economy increases the range of values of φ for which the
non-cooperative standard leads to inefficiently high levels of environmental protection. Finally, from
the definition of
_
φ we note that even with transboundary pollution it is possible that green welfare is
highest in the non-cooperative equilibrium provided φ <
_
φ.
7 Desensitization of Pollution & Interdependence Sovereignty
In this section we are interested in the relationship between decentralization and the marginal ben-
efits of meeting the domestic standard. The reasons for our interest are twofold. First, I-O linkages
introduce new channels through which N affects the marginal benefits of environmental policy (i.e.
spillback effects). Second, decentralization is of interest from an empirical perspective as well. In re-
cent decades economic growth in numerous developing countries has lead to a decrease of the income
share of the traditional economic superpowers in world GDP, giving rise to a new multipolar world
economy. Essentially, decentralization changes the magnitude of the various externalities that influence
non-cooperative policymaking, thereby capturing a key aspect of the before mentioned trend in global
economic development.
To commence our formal analysis, total differentiation of ΩB  η(εz,θ + φ(N   1)εlz,θ)(n
_
z) with
respect to N leads to:
d
dN
(ΩB) =
ΩB
εz,θ + φ(N   1)εlz,θ
d(εz,θ + φ(N   1)εlz,θ)
dN
+
ΩB
n
_
z
∂(n
_
z)
∂N
< 0
The total derivative of ΩB consists of two terms. The first term on the right-hand side explains how the
marginal benefit of a standard increases with the elasticity of (global) pollution with respect to domestic
environmental policy,
d(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
dN , whereas the second term shows how a decrease in country size
decreases pollution and in turn diminishes the marginal benefit of a standard17. The impact of decen-
tralization on the marginal benefits of meeting the domestic standard is strictly negative, ddN (Ω
B) < 0.
To explain the influence of I-O linkages in more detail, consider first the impact of decentralization on
the upperbound of pollution n
_
z. From n
_
z =

(1  β)M 1ε 1
 1 β
β τLw
N we can derive that
∂(n
_
z)
∂N =   n
_
z
N < 0
and ∂∂β

∂(n
_
z)
∂N

< 0. In words, if country size diminishes then pollution per country declines and this
effect is stronger if the degree of I-O linkages increases (e.g. β decreases). Some interesting characteris-
tics of the derivative of the elasticity of (global) pollution with respect to country size (decentralization)
are documented in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Desensitization of pollution with respect to local environmental policy.
Under decentralization (N "):
17In theory, voluntary contributions to global public goods tend to be positively correlated with country size (see Vickary (2009))
because populous countries capture a relatively large share of the benefits from their mitigation efforts. Similarly, decentralization
lowers the marginal benefits of meeting the domestic standard simply because smaller countries produce less (endowment effect).
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(i) pollution in any given country becomes less responsive to local environmental policy ( dεz,θdN < 0 and
dεlz,θ
dN < 0).
(ii) the responsiveness of global pollution is (strictly) negative (
d(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
dN =  (1  φ)(1  β) dadN  0).
An increase in the degree of vertical integration (β #):
(iii) increases the responsiveness of pollution in any given country to local environmental policy ( dεz,θdβ < 0 and
dεlz,θ
dβ < 0).
Decentralization affects the responsiveness of pollution with respect to local environmental regula-
tion. The impact of any given country through environmental policy on pollution at home and in other
countries diminishes ( dεz,θdN < 0,
dεlz,θ
dN < 0 and
d(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
dN < 0) when countries become smaller.
These derivatives summarize what we define as desensitization: the marginal reduction in domestic pol-
lution due to a higher standard becomes smaller if country size decreases (N increases). On the other
hand, an increase in the degree of vertical integration leads to the opposite result of domestic pollution
being more responsive to changes in domestic environmental policy. If one is willing to define global-
ization as increases in vertical integration and decentralization, then clearly the impact of globalization
on the responsiveness of pollution is ambiguous.
In our view, proposition 4 describes an important and a somewhat overlooked aspect of environ-
mental policy in open economies. The fact that local pollution become less responsive to local policies in
a globalized world represents a separate pathway through which trade affects green welfare. To explain
this effect in more detail, consider the following explanation. Refer to the sector producing the com-
posite intermediate good as the upstream industry and the sector producing intermediate goods as the
downstream industry. In any particular country, the downstream industry depends on inputs from the
upstream industry and vice versa. In addition, the upstream industry depends on inputs of intermedi-
ate inputs from other countries as well. In this global web of downstream and upstream industries, the
impact of environmental regulation is weakened when country size diminishes. In particular, the weak
link effect and the global technology effect of a marginal change in environmental policy, as described
under proposition 1, are diminished for higher degrees of decentralization.
Of course, in general one would expect the effectiveness of local (environmental) policies to be in-
terdependent on the actions taken by other countries. The question whether a country can (effectively)
exercise control over its domestic affairs is related to the concept of national sovereignty. Following
Krasner (1999), Bagwell and Staiger (2004) use four distinct ways to define sovereignty in order to
evaluate how sovereignty and international efficiency conflict in a two-country model of international
interdependence (e.g. trade interactions). Especially relevant here is their definition of interdependence
sovereignty, which ’refers to the scope of activities over which states can effectively exercise control’
(Bagwell and Staiger, 2004). In our setting this relates to the question whether countries can effec-
tively exercise control over local environmental quality. Proposition 4 shows us that in a globalized
world countries loose control not only over domestic pollution ( dεz,θdN < 0), but are also faced with a
decreasing impact on what happens abroad (
dεlz,θ
dN < 0). Having said that, in the case of global warm-
ing (φ = 1) a nation’s control over global environmental quality is unaffected by globalization, that is,
d(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
dN = 0. For strictly local pollutants (φ = 0) one obtains the result that interdependence
sovereignty is indeed increasingly diminished,
∂(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
∂N =  (1   β) dadN < 0. An interesting
set of questions for future research is in what form desensitization is present in more general models
with trade costs and whether our results are robust with respect to country asymmetries and market
structure.
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8 Global Welfare, Green Welfare and other properties of the Nash
equilibrium
Next, let us discuss a few interesting properties of the non-cooperative standard under transboundary
pollution. Our interest goes out to the impact of decentralization (N) and the impact of I-O linkages
(β). First of all, analytically we find that the non-cooperative solution is ambiguous with respect to
N ( dθ
NC
dN =   1Φ

ΩC
ΩB
 1
Φ

dΩC/dN
ΩC   dΩ
B/dN
ΩB

? 0). While decentralization (N ") increases the extent
of regulatory decoupling (ΩC #) it also exacerbates the free-riding motive (ΩB #). Using (28) we also
find that stronger I-O linkages potentially lead to a higher non-cooperative standard ( dθ
NC
dβ ? 0). How
can we explain this ambiguity? We find that the effect of a marginal change in β on the marginal cost
(benefit) of meeting the domestic standard is always negative (ambiguous), that is, dΩ
C
dβ <   1β 1N b < 0
and dΩ
B
dβ ? 0. Even more interesting, when production technology is characterized by a strong I-O
structure then the strength of the free-riding effect is possibly reduced, that is, ddβ (
dθNC
dN ) 7 0.
To explore the ambiguity of our results in more detail, we conduct some numerical experiments.
Figure 1 depicts the level of the non-cooperative standard as a function of the degree of centralization
(N) and the strength of the I-O linkages (β). We take the following parameters: α = 0.3 , τ = 0.5 , ε = 2
, M = 1 , Lw = 10 and η = 10. The following observations stand out:
 Ceteris paribus a higher level of decentralization lowers the non-cooperative standard.
 Stronger I-O linkages reduce the non-cooperative standard.
 The negative impact of decentralization on the non-cooperative standard does not seem to be
affected by the strength of the I-O structure.
The first observation tells us that, even though we have not been able to derive an analytical proof,
the non-cooperative standard decreases monotonically under decentralization. We also find that a
stronger I-O structure decreases the optimal standard. So far we have not been able to find parame-
ter values that show otherwise. The third observation explains that even though in theory a stronger
I-O structure could mitigate the negative effects of decentralization, our numerical experiments indicate
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that the overall effect is likely to be small ( ∂∂β (
∂θNC
∂N )  0).
Figure 1a: The impact of decentralization &
IO-linkages on the optimal standard Figure 1b: Can IO-linkages reduce global pollution?
Like the equilibrium properties of the non-cooperative standard, signing the derivatives of equilib-
rium pollution with respect to N and β is not trivial. A change in the strength of the I-O structure of the
world economy, as captured by the parameter β, affects world pollution by changing the magnitude of
the various composition and technique effects that we identified; a higher β decreases emission inten-
sity (e(θ) #) and decreases the ratio of net output over gross output ((1  θ) #), but has an ambiguous
effect on the total input (and production) of the composite intermediate good due to a positive market
share term (λ1 β "), a positive composition effect ((1  β)
1 β
β ") and an ambiguous global technology
effect (G
1 β
β "#). All in all, the total effect on world pollution of a change in β is ambiguous.
We depict the effects of decentralization and the strength of I-O linkages on global pollution in
figure 1b. Again, the results that follow from this numerical exercise are clear. First, the level of global
pollution is increasing in the degree of decentralization. As was evident from the explanation following
proposition 2, this is caused by the overwhelming impact of free-riding on the willingness to reduce
emissions. Second, and closely related to the previous observation, decentralization increases global
pollution, but the extent to which this happens is reduced if I-O linkages are stronger (low β). Note
that for high levels of decentralization the effect of β on global pollution is u-shaped: at low levels of
vertical integration a decrease in β raises pollution but once β is sufficiently small further decreases
actually lower pollution. Thus, even though environmental policy is less stringent when I-O linkages
are stronger (see figure 1a), numerical experiments indicate that for most parameter values the effects
on global pollution are actually positive: strong linkages eventually reduce pollution, especially when
decentralization is high.
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9 Conclusion
In countries with a high trade intensity regulators are faced with relatively low costs of abatement since
part of these costs fall on foreign consumers via higher prices. In such a setting domestic policy makers
might impose excessively stringent environmental policies. We extended this idea by considering I-O
linkages. We were then able to analyze the implications for global pollution and global welfare. A
surprising result is that in a world with trade in intermediate goods, mitigating countries do not have
to worry about carbon leakage. Stringent regulation lowers the supply of intermediate goods to world
markets. Since intermediate inputs, like physical capital, are produced inputs a decrease in their supply
will lower pollution in the importing countries.
We also found (i) that whether global environmental quality is higher in the social optimum or the
non-cooperative equilibrium depends on the degree of spillovers and (ii) that I-O linkages reduce the
difference between these equilibria. Nevertheless, in case of fully transboundary pollution a race to the
bottom can not be prevented, even if one is willing to assume an unrealistically strong I-O structure.
Thus, in the absence of global cooperation underprovision of global environmental quality remains an
important issue. Using numerical analysis we then showed that, even though I-O linkages do not out-
weigh the impact of free-riding on the stringency of environmental policy, these linkages effectively
magnify the productivity loss that is caused by global emission standards, thereby reducing global pol-
lution. On a somewhat different note, we were able to show that local pollution becomes less respon-
sive to local policy in a globalized world, which represents a novel pathway through which trade affects
green welfare. It was then explained that vertical integration limits this process of desensitization.
The model used in this chapter was deliberately simple, thereby allowing for a range of analytically
tractable results. Future work might focus on the implications of models where specialization patterns
are endogenous, as well as examining the case with an endogenous number of global varieties. Another
point of interest is to repeat the analysis with asymmetric countries. Probably more interesting is a more
detailed assessment of climate change policies in the presence of both international (and national) I-O
structures (see Leontief (1970) and Levinson (2009)). At the industry level, more detailed analysis of
sectors involving trade in intermediate goods might be a worthwhile endeavor as well18. This seems
especially interesting in the context of certain sectors, such as energy and transportation. These sectors
seem of vital importance not only to the world economy, as measured by the degree to which they are
linked to other sectors in the global economy, but, since they are very carbon intensive, are also crucial
for mitigation of climate change.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proofs of Results and Propositions
Result 1 More stringent environmental policy reduces the domestic wage rate,
dwj
dθ j
= (
1
β
N   1
N
1
1+ β(ε  1)| {z }
ToT
  1
β|{z}
TFP
)p0 = (a  b)p0 < 0,
via a negative TFP effect ( bp0 < 0) and a positive terms-of-trade effect (ap0 > 0), where a  1β N 1N 11+β(ε 1)
and b  1β denote respectively the terms-of-trade coefficient and the TFP coefficient. Foreign wages are affected
as well via terms-of-trade spillovers,
dwj
dθ j
=   1N 1 ap0 < 0. Prices of intermediate goods increase at home and
decrease abroad,
dpj
dθ j
= βa p1 θ > 0 and
dpi
dθ j
=  β 1N 1 a p1 θ < 0.
Proof Let us denote variables of the country under consideration by subscript A and use B to denote
the other countries (which are ex-ante symmetric from the point of view of country A). First, we use
npq = τβ I in (1  β)
R M
0 p(i)q(i)di = (1  β)Nnpq to obtain (1  β)
R M
0 p(i)q(i)di =
1 β
β τ I
w. Using
this result, pA =
(wA)β
1 θA and I
w = IA + (N   1)IB we can rewrite the balanced trade condition, τ IA =
βn(pA)1 ε[τ Iw + (1  β)
R M
0 p(i)q(i)di], as:
wAL = n

wAβ
1  θA
1 ε
[wAL+ (N   1)wBL] (29)
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The price index can be represented as:
1 = n

wAβ
1  θA
1 ε
+ (N   1)n

wBβ
1  θB
1 ε
(30)
Total differentiation of (29) and (30) with respect to fwA, wB, θAg, thereby taking θB, LB and LA as
constant, gives us:
IA
wA
dwA =
IA
Iw
(
IA
wA
dwA + (N   1) IBwB dwB) + β(1  ε)
IA
wA
dwA + (1  ε) IA1  θA dθA (31)
0 = β
LA
Iw
dwA +
1
1  θA
IA
Iw
dθA + (N   1)β LBIw dwB (32)
Rearranging (31) and noting that LB = LA leads to:
dwB =
1
(N   1)IA [(1+ β(ε  1))I
w   IA]dwA   1N   1
1  ε
1  θA
Iw
LB
dθA (33)
Substitution of (33) into (32), evaluating in the symmetric equilibrium (wA = wB and θA = θB) and
rearranging terms then provides for the equilibrium solution:
dwA
dθA
=   1
β
1
N
1+ β(ε  1)N
1+ β(ε  1) p
0 (34)
= (  1
β|{z}
TFP
+
1
β
N   1
N
1
1+ β(ε  1)| {z }
ToT
)p0
Substitution of dwAdθA in
dpA
dθA
= β pAwA
dwA
dθA
+ pA1 θA and applying symmetry yields
dpA
dθA
= a p1 θ . These results
can also be used to derive the effect on wages and prices in other countries. First, rewrite (33):
dwB
dθA
=
(1+ β(ε  1))Iw   IA
(N   1)IA
dwA
dθA
  1
N   1
1  ε
1  θA
Iw
LB
(35)
Second, substitution of (34) into (35) yields:
dwB
dθA
=
dpB
dθA
=  

1
β
1
N
1
1+ β(ε  1)

p0 =   1
N   1 ap
0 < 0
Recall that by definition we must have dpAdθA + (N   1)
dpB
dθB
= 0, which tells us that the terms-of-trade
effects work purely distributive (zero-sum). This completes the proof.
Result 2 Boomerang mechanism of environmental policy.
The terms-of-trade effect and the TFP effect are monotonically increasing in the so-called ’intermediate goods mul-
tiplier’ 1β 2 [1,∞).
Proof Inspection of
dwj
dθ j
in (34) immediately shows that the TFP coefficient is proportional to 1/β. With
respect to the terms-of-trade coefficient a, differentiation shows that dad(1/β) =
a
1/β (1+ β
ε 1
1+β(ε 1) ) > 0.
This completes the proof.
Result 3 Terms-of-trade effects of stricter environmental policy are larger when the degree of decentralization
increases, dadN =
d
dN (
1
β
N 1
N εP) =
1
β
1
N2 εP > 0. Stated otherwise, the beneficial terms-of-trade effect that lowers
the costs of environmental policy is increasing with the number of countries.
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Proof Inspection of a  b =

1
β
N 1
N εP   1β

immediately shows d(a b)dN =
∂a
∂N =
1
β
1
N2 εP > 0.
Proposition 1 Under a unilateral marginal increase in the stringency of environmental policy:
1) pollution is affected by (i) a weak link effect and (ii) a global technology effect. The weak link effect decreases
pollution at home but increases pollution abroad. The global technology effect decreases pollution in all countries.
2) pollution is reduced at home, that is,
dzj
dθ j
=  εz,θ z1 θ < 0.
3) (carbon) leakage is negative, dzidθ j =  εlz,θ
z
1 θ < 0 if and only if β < 1. There is zero leakage (
dzi
dθ j
= 0) if there
is no I-O structure (β = 1).
Proof (1) Total differentiation of (22) with respect to θA leads to
dzA
dθA
= zA
e0(θA)
e(θA)
  zA 11  θA + zA(1  β)
1
λA
dλA
dθA| {z }
weak link effect A
+ zA
1  β
β
1
G
dG
dθA| {z }
global technology effect
(36)
dzB
dθA
= zB(1  β) 1λB
dλB
dθA| {z }
weak link effect B
+ zB
1  β
β
1
G
dG
dθA| {z }
global technology effect
(37)
where the last two terms on the right-hand side represent respectively the weak link effect and the
global technology effect. Since dλAdθA < 0,
dλB
dθA
> 0 and dGdθA < 0 it follows that the weak link effect in
country A (B) is negative (positive) whereas the global technology effect is negative. (2) Substitution of
dλA
dθA
= λA(
1
wA
dwA
dθA
  1wA+(N 1)wB (
dwA
dθA
+ (N   1) dwBdθA )) and
dG
dθA
= n
ε
ε 1

 λ1 βA + (1  θA)(1  β)λ
 β
A
dλA
dθA
+ (N   1)(1  θB)(1  β)λ βB dλBdθA

, using result 1, apply-
ing symmetry and using the definition of εz,θ provides us with
dzj
dθ j
=  εz,θ z1 θ < 0. (3) Similar to (2),
substitution of dGdθA and
dλB
dθA
= λB(
1
wB
dwB
dθA
  1wA+(N 1)wB (
dwA
dθA
+ (N   1) dwBdθA )) into (37), applying sym-
metry and using the definition of εlz,θ gives us
dzi
dθ j
=  εlz,θ z1 θ < 0. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 (i) Under transboundary pollution (φ > 0) we find θS ? θNC , (N   1)ΩBl (N)ΩC(N) ?
aτΩB(N).
(ii) Under purely local pollution (φ = 0) we have θS < θNC.
(iii) There exists a unique
_
φ  1N 1
aεz,θ+(a b)(N 1)εlz,θ
 (a b)(εz,θ+(N 2)εlz,θ) aεlz,θ
such that θS ? θNC for all φ ?
_
φ provided
_
φ 2 (0, 1].
Proof (i) Substitution of the coefficients from definition 1 into (28) results in the following expressions
for the pollution standard:
θNC = 1 
"
τ(b  a)
ηn(εz,θ + φ(N   1)εlz,θ)
_
z
# 1
Φ
(38)
θS = 1 
24 1
ηn
_
z
τb
εz,θ + φ(N   1)εlz,θ + (N   1)

φ(εz,θ + (N   2)εlz,θ) + εlz,θ

35 1Φ (39)
where Φ  (1 α)β+α α(1 τ)(1 σ)αβ > 0. Comparing these solutions shows us that
θS ? θNC , (N   1)ΩBl (N)ΩC(N) ? aτΩB(N). (ii) If there are no spillovers the expression for the
standard in social optimum from (39) reads θSjφ=0 = 1 

1
ηn
_
z
τb
εz,θ+2(N 1)εlz,θ
 1
Φ
. Quick inspection of θS
and θNC some rearrangement reveals that θS < θNC ,  (a   b)(N   1)εlz,θ < aεz,θ , 0 < 1α . (iii)
From (i) we find that
_
φ is implicitly defined by θS = θNC. Rearranging leads to an explicit expression,
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_
φ  1N 1
aεz,θ+(a b)(N 1)εlz,θ
 (a b)(εz,θ+(N 2)εlz,θ) aεlz,θ
.
Proposition 3 For φ < (>)
_
φ we find that green welfare is higher (lower) in the non-cooperative equilibrium
than in the social optimum.
Proof Since θS ? θNC for φ ?
_
φ we have Z(θS) ? Z(θNC) for φ ?
_
φ. This completes the proof.
Proposition 4 Desensitization of pollution with respect to local environmental policy.
Under decentralization (N "):
(i) pollution in any given country becomes less responsive to local environmental policy ( dεz,θdN < 0 and
dεlz,θ
dN < 0).
(ii) the responsiveness of global pollution is (strictly) negative (
d(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
dN =  (1  φ)(1  β) dadN  0).
An increase in the degree of vertical integration (β #):
(iii) increases the responsiveness of pollution in any given country to local environmental policy ( dεz,θdβ < 0 and
dεlz,θ
dβ < 0).
Proof Total differentiation of εz,θ and εlz,θ with respect to N shows us
dεz,θ
dN =  (1   β) dadN < 0 and
dεlz,θ
dN =  (1  β) 1N 1 aN =  
εlz,θ
N < 0. Using these derivatives one can show that
d(εz,θ+φ(N 1)εlz,θ)
dN =  (1   φ)(1   β) dadN  0. This proofs (i) and (ii). Total differentiation of εz,θ and
εlz,θ with respect to β gives us
dεz,θ
dβ =
1
β (a  b) + (1 β)(ε 1)1+β(ε 1) a < 1β (a  b) + (ε  1)a =   1β 1N b < 0 and
dεlz,θ
dβ =   aN 1 + 1 βN 1 dadβ < 0. This completes the proof.
10.2 Derivation of the Balanced Trade Condition
10.2.1 Direct Method
Three steps are needed. First, using (2) profit maximization in the intermediate goods sector results in:
wjljy = βpjyj and xjy = (1  β)pjyj (40)
Second, profit maximization in the final goods sector gives us wjLjC = (1  τ)Ij. Using this result, the
definition of nominal income Ij = wjL = pjCC and (10) we obtain
nwjljy = τ Ij (41)
Combining (40) and (41) then provides us with expressions for ljy and xjy as function of parameters
and domestic income, ljy =
τ Ij
nwj
and xjy = (
1 β
β )
τ Ij
n , as well as being able to rewrite ∑
j=N
j=1 npjqj =
∑
j=N
j=1
τ
β Ij =
τ
β I
w. Third, we then substitute ljy =
τ Ij
nwj
and xjy = (
1 β
β )
τ Ij
n into qj = (1  θ j)(ljy)β(xjy)1 β,
which in turn we substitute for qj on the left-hand side of the demand function (11) and finally we
rearrange to get:
Ij = n(pj)1 ε Iw
which equals (14) in the main text.
10.2.2 Alternative Method
Setting imports (12) equal to exports (13), we can write
npjyj   npjyjj =∑
i
npiyij   npjyjj
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On the left-hand side we can substitute for npjyj = np1 εj
τ
β I
w and npjyjj = npjyj
Xj
Xw = np
1 ε
j
τ
β Ij:
EXj = npjyj   npjyjj = np1 εj
τ
β
(1  Ij
Iw
)Iw
On the right-hand side we can substitute for ∑i npiyij =
τ
β Ij and npjyjj =
τ
β Ij
Ij
Iw :
IMj =∑
i
npiyij   npjyjj = τβ Ij(1 
Ij
Iw
)
Equating imports and export results in the equation obtained in the main text, Ij = np1 εj I
w.
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